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Abstract—We consider a blockchain-based protocol for
the certification of academic credentials named Blockcerts,
which is currently used worldwide for validating digital
certificates of competence compliant with the Open Badges
standard. We study the certification steps that are per-
formed by the Blockcerts protocol to validate a certificate,
and find that they are vulnerable to a certain type
of impersonation attacks. More in detail, authentication
of the issuing institution is performed by retrieving an
unauthenticated issuer profile online, and comparing some
data reported there with those included in the issued
certificate. We show that, by fabricating a fake issuer
profile and generating a suitably altered certificate, an
attacker is able to impersonate a legitimate issuer and
can produce certificates that cannot be distinguished from
originals by the Blockcerts validation procedure. We also
propose some possible countermeasures against an attack
of this type, which require the use of a classic public key
infrastructure or a decentralized identity system integrated
with the Blockcerts protocol.
Index Terms—Academic credentials, Blockcerts,
blockchain, competence certification, forgery,
impersonation, Open Badges, vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The certification of competences and academic
credentials plays a fundamental role in modern
societies and everyday life. Classically, such a cer-
tification is performed through paper certificates
containing seals and signatures. These documents,
however, have no uniformity among different coun-
tries as well as no recognized digital equivalent and,
most importantly, are subject to falsification. This
is confirmed by several cases occurred in recent
years, as in the case of the dean of admissions at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
who declared to have fabricated and lied about her
own educational credentials for 28 years [1]. In
this context, an internationally recognized standard
for the digitalization and authentication of com-
petence certificates (as transcripts, diplomas, etc.)
and academic credentials becomes a must. Besides
providing strong authentication mechanisms, such
a system should also aim at establishing an in-
ternationally recognized format for portability and
verification of competences.
The first step into verifying competences online
and everywhere was made by the Mozilla Founda-
tion [2] in collaboration with the McArthur Foun-
dation [3], through the open-source project called
Open Badges [4]. The scope of Open Badges is to
provide organizations and institutions with a system
for issuing digital badges to the competence owners
in order to recognize not only their official learning
but even transversal skills. For this purpose, certifi-
cates compliant with Open Badges are designed to
provide a detailed profile of the recipient, including
the so-called Diploma Supplement [5], collecting all
the academic records of a student, giving this way a
clear picture about the competences gained during
the academic path. The Open Badges standard hence
provides a tool for implementing digital, enriched
versions of competence certificates and academic
credentials. However, the certification of the com-
petences covered by one of these digital badges is
out of the scope of the Open Badges standard itself.
With the aim to fill such a gap, the use of
blockchain technology has emerged as a valu-
able solution for the validation of Open Badges-
compliant certificates [6]. The most widespread and
internationally adopted blockchain-based system for
the validation of these certificates was developed
by the MIT Media Lab [7] in collaboration with
Learning Machine [8], and is called Blockcerts [9].
According to the Blockcerts standard, Open
Badges-compliant certificates are cryptographically
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2signed by the issuer, while their certification data
is written into a public blockchain, thus leverag-
ing its immutability. Recipients can share them
publicly on their social media profiles, personal
websites, etc., and everyone can see the contents of
the certificates with the possibility to verify their
validity and authenticity through the blockchain.
The use of the blockchain technology makes the
process of verification globally accessible and in-
stantaneous, with no need for long procedures and
institutional bureaucratic correspondences. Another
important point lays in the fact that Blockcerts
passes from paper-based certificates to software-
based certificates. A Blockcerts certificate is fully-
machine readable since it is designed as software in
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format [10].
In this paper we review the steps of issuance
and validation of a certificate compliant with the
Blockcerts protocol, with the aim of analyzing its
security and resistance to forgery. In particular,
we focus on the certificate authentication process
through the blockchain, which is designed to be
decentralized and self-consistent. For this purpose,
each certificate must contain all the necessary in-
formation for its validation through the blockchain,
including a reference to the public key of the issuer
to be used for its validation. We show that such a
feature, although allowing decentralized validation,
opens the door to possible forgery attacks. We first
describe how an attack of this type can be mounted,
and then we show its feasibility through a practical
example.
For this purpose, we generate a forged but verifi-
able academic certificate. Such a forged certificate
appears to be correctly issued by the Universita`
Politecnica delle Marche according to the Block-
certs protocol, despite it has been fabricated without
involving the aforementioned institution. In fact,
by generating a valid blockchain key pair, and
following a few simple steps, it was possible to
impersonate the issuing institution and fabricate an
apparently valid academic certificate. This is due
to the fact that the Blockcerts verification system
does not check if the public keys are actually owned
by the legitimate issuing institution or not. In order
to prevent this type of attacks, we propose some
countermeasures aimed at avoiding that a fake issuer
profile can be accepted by the certificate verification
protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we describe the Open Badges and Blockcerts
standard that are the object of our work. In Section
III we describe a vulnerability in the Blockcerts
certificate validation procedure and how it can be
exploited to fabricate forged academic credentials.
In Section IV we describe some possible counter-
measures aimed at preventing the aforementioned
attack, while in Section V we provide some conclu-
sive remarks.
II. OPEN BADGES AND BLOCKCERTS
Next we briefly describe the Open Badges and
Blockcerts standards, focusing on their features that
are of interest for the purposes of our study.
A. Open Badges
Open Badges represents a group of specifica-
tions and open technical standards developed by
the Mozilla Foundation [2] with funding from the
MacArthur Foundation [3] and a network of partners
committed into developing a new way to recognize
learning wherever it happened, in and out of formal
education and online [4].
In 2011, The Mozilla Foundation announced its
plan to develop the technical standard called Open
Badges as a response to the trend of documenting
and representing skills and/or achievements online
through badges. The Open Badges project defines
an open specification and application program in-
terfaces that provide any organization with the ba-
sic building blocks required to offer badges in a
standard, interoperable manner [11]. Open Badges
also allow combining different badges together. This
allows painting a complete profile of an individual’s
identity, achievements, hobbies, and skills, creating
this way a digital passport of the relevant compe-
tences. Collecting all this information in a single
badge makes the process of finding a job easier, or
makes it easier to find the right person to hire for
a job. Once this project started, there was a global
interest and an international community was formed
almost immediately.
In practice, an Open Badge is an image file that
contains embedded metadata. Such data represent
the scope of the badge, that is, they describe why
it was awarded, who issued it, who earned it, etc.
The metadata also contains information about the
criteria to achieve the badge and how to verify the
authenticity of that particular badge.
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data embedded into an Open Badge is collected
into a JavaScript Object Notation - Linked Data
(JSON-LD) [10] context file [13]. The core ele-
ments involved in the process of issuing an Open
Badges-compliant digital badge are: i) Profile, ii)
BadgeClass and iii) Assertion. These three elements
are combined to create the digital badge, and are
described next, along with the links among them.
1) Profile: Every organization and individual is-
suing and receiving Open Badges is represented by a
Profile section [12]. The Profile section collects the
information that identifies the issuer, thus providing
an Issuer Profile, or the receiver, thus providing
a Receiver Profile. Concerning the Issuer Profile,
the following information is mandatory [12]: i)
id, ii) type, iii) name, iv) url and v) email. The
Issuer Profile may be completed with the following
additional (optional) fields [12]: i) description, ii)
image, iii) telephone, iv) public key, v) verification
and vi) revocation list. All these entries provide a
full and clear picture of the issuer. Differently from
the Issuer Profile, in the Recipient Profile the only
mandatory fields are id and type [12], while all the
other elements are optional.
2) BadgeClass: A BadgeClass contains the de-
scription of the achievement the Issuer recognizes
[12]. As an example, for a student graduating at the
university, a BadgeClass containing the information
of the Degree must be created. The information
embedded in BadgeClass contains fields such as the
name and the description of the achieved degree,
the image of the badge and the criteria on how this
particular badge can be earned. In addition to this
information, BadgeClass includes an Issuer Profile
to identify the institution who created and issued
the badge. The full list of entries included in the
BadgeClass is [12]: i) id, ii) type, iii) name, iv)
description, v) image, vi) criteria and vii) issuer.
The list is completed with the following optional
properties [12]: i) alignment, ii) tags.
3) Assertion: The collection of information rep-
resenting the awarded badge plus the information
about the recipient of the badge creates the so-called
Assertion element [12]. The Assertion links to the
BadgeClass and contains some specific information
like the date in which the badge is awarded, the
identifier of the badge recipient, and other additional
information like an expiration date or an evidence
url. The entries included in the Assertion section
are [12]: i) id, ii) type, iii) recipient, iv) badge, v)
verification, and vi) issuedOn, while the additional
optional properties are [12]: i) image, ii) evidence,
iii) narrative, iv) expires, v) revoked and vi) revo-
cationReason.
The three sections Profile, BadgeClass and Asser-
tion are combined together generating this way the
Open Badge. A graphic view of the link between
each section is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Open Badges issuing paradigm
Based on the above elements, issuing of Open
Badges involves the following steps:
1) Issuers create BadgeClasses and award asser-
tions to the recipients.
2) The recipient of an Open Badge is free to
share it on social media, via e-mail or in some
other form, with friends, family and potential
employers.
3) Everyone can check the authenticity of the
badge and the fact that it was awarded to the
person who claims it was awarded to through
the information included in the badge itself.
B. Blockcerts
With the aim of having a global system for
the verification of academic records, the develop-
ment of Blockcerts [9] was initiated in 2015 as
part of a research project by the MIT Media Lab
[7] in collaboration with Learning Machine [8].
The Blockcerts project exploits the Open Badges
framework jointly with the blockchain technology
in order to realize a global, decentralized notary
with the following claimed features [14]: i) Tamper
evidence, ii) Issuer and recipient ownership, iii)
Flexible form factor, iv) Online and offline sharing
with verification and v) Independent verification.
The project was officially launched in 2016 and all
the reference libraries were published under the MIT
Open Source Licence, making the code accessible
4and free of charge. Therefore, Blockcerts is defined
as an open standard for creating, issuing, viewing
and verifying blockchain-based certificates.
Basically, the issuer can autonomously create a
structured Blockcerts certificate, sign it and certify
its integrity by storing a hash digest of the certificate
within a blockchain transaction. Then, the issuer can
send the recipient a copy of the signed Blockerts
certificate that can be shared in social networks,
via e-mail, etc. Anyone accessing the certificate can
verify its integrity using an open platform called
Blockcerts Universal Verifier [9], that performs a
blockchain-based integrity check.
The whole lifecycle of a Blockcerts-based certifi-
cate is schematically described in Figure 2. After
successfully completing her/his studies, the student
is asked to provide a public blockchain address
by the issuing institution. For this purpose, the
student generates a private/public keypair for the
used blockchain, and then computes her/his public
address as the output of a one-way function ap-
plied to her/his public key. At the same time (or
before) a Blockcerts-compliant certificate template
is created by the issuing institution. Then, a new
certificate is issued and released to the student,
along with a blockchain transaction to the student’s
public address that enables verification of the issued
certificate.
Figure 2: Sequence flow of the Blockcerts system
More details about the Blockcerts standards, and
the certification issuing and verification process are
provided in the next sections.
1) Blockcerts Certificate Design: Each Block-
certs certificate contains structured data concerning
the certificate itself, its issuer and its recipient.
Information about the certificate concerns:
1) certificate description,
2) certificate title,
3) certificate criteria,
4) embedded images,
5) certificate template.
Information about the issuer concerns:
1) issuer url: URL of the issuing institution
website.
2) issuer email: email address of the issuing
institution.
3) issuer name: name of the issuing institution.
4) issuer id: URL where the Hosted Issuer Pro-
file can be found.
5) revocation list: URL of the list of revoked
certificates.
6) issuer signature lines: information about
who issued a Blockcerts certificate. This field
is introduced considering the fact that in big
organizations, there are different entities/per-
sons/departments that can issue certificates.
7) issuer public key: issuer blockchain public
key. For the sake of correctness, we observe
that, although being denoted as public key,
this indeed is a public identifier obtained as
the output of a one-way function applied to
the real public key, as it occurs in the Bitcoin
and Ethereum blockchains.
For the purpose of this work, an important field
among those above is the issuer id, which is the
URL of a web page containing the issuer infor-
mation in JSON format. An example is shown in
Figure 3.
Figure 3: Hosted issuer profile
5As we see from Figure 3, such information
includes the institution name, homepage, logo, e-
mail address, etc., and, importantly, the public keys
claimed by the issuer. Each key has a timestamp
corresponding to its creation and possibly the times-
tamp corresponding to its expiration.
Information about the recipient instead concerns:
1) name,
2) email,
3) blockchain public key.
In addition to the aforementioned information, the
Blockcerts standard allows embedding the so-called
diploma supplement into a certificate. The diploma
supplement is produced by higher education in-
stitutions according to international and European
recommendations, and includes the following eight
sections:
1) Information identifying the holder of the qual-
ification.
2) Information identifying the qualification.
3) Information on the level of the qualification.
4) Information on the contents and results
gained.
5) Information on the function of the qualifica-
tion.
6) Additional information.
7) Information identifying the issuer of the qual-
ification.
8) Information on the national higher education
system.
It includes additional information about the
course attended (e.g., results for each exam/course
with date and outcome) and the competences
achieved by the recipient of the certificate. The
diploma supplement is recognized as an official doc-
ument accompanying a higher education diploma,
providing a standardized description of the nature,
level, context, content and status of the studies
completed by its holder.
2) Issuing Blockcerts Certificate: All the prelim-
inary steps required for issuing certificates com-
pliant with the Blockcerts standard can be imple-
mented through the cert-tools open source software
[15], which allows generating a certificate template
first, and then instantiating such a template into
one or more certificates. This allows generating an
unsigned certificate, which then has to be signed
and written into the blockchain network, besides
sending a copy to the recipient. These steps can
be performed through the cert-issuer software tool
[16]. Delivery of the certificate is performed by
creating a transaction from the issuing institution to
the certificate recipient on the Bitcoin or Ethereum
blockchain that includes the hash of the certificate
itself. While it is possible to issue one certificate
with one Bitcoin/Ethereum transaction, a solution
for reducing the amount of data written to the
blockchain is that of using one Bitcoin/Ethereum
transaction to issue a batch of certificates. This
is possible through the generation of a Merkle
tree of certificate hashes, in such a way that only
the Merkle tree root has to be written into the
blockchain.
3) Certificate Authenticity Verification: Through
the verification process, anyone can verify the au-
thenticity of a certificate, having clear information
about the institution that issued it and a proof that
the certificate was actually issued to the claiming
recipient. The certificate verification process starts
with the following three steps:
1) Verification that the hash digest of the certifi-
cate matches the value in the receipt.
2) Verification that the Merkle path is valid.
3) Verification that the Merkle root stored into
the blockchain matches the value in the re-
ceipt.
Through the above steps, anyone can verify that
a certificate has not been tampered since its issuing.
The next important step of the verification process
is authenticating the certificate issuer, i.e., verify-
ing the identity of the issuing institution. This is
achieved by verifying that the signing key for the
blockchain transaction through which the certificate
was issued corresponds to the issuer public key,
and that it was valid when the transaction took
place. This uses the timestamp and input address
from the blockchain transaction details, and the
issuer information provided along with the Issuer
Profile, described in Section II-B. For this purpose,
the blockchain transaction id is extracted from the
certificate receipt. The transaction id allows veri-
fying that the transaction was actually registered
into the blockchain and retrieving the corresponding
transaction details. The issuer public key can be
found within such details, as shown in Figure 4.
6Figure 4: Extraction of the issuer public key from
the transaction details
Then, the issuer id is extracted from the certifi-
cate to retrieve the Hosted Issuer Profile from the
corresponding url. The issuer public key included in
the Hosted Issuer Profile is then compared with the
one found in the blockchain transaction, as shown
in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Issuer identity verification
If the two keys do not coincide, an error is
returned and the certificate is considered invalid.
Otherwise, the timestamps are checked to prove that
the key was valid at the time of the transaction. In
addition, if the public key included in the issuer
profile has an expiration date, it is checked that the
transaction did not take place after that date. If all
these verification steps succeed, then the certificate
is considered as valid. All the steps of the issuer
identity verification are schematically described in
Figure 6.
Figure 6: Blockcerts issuer verification process
III. FABRICATING ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS
In this section we show that apparently valid
certificates issued by any institution can indeed be
fabricated by a malicious attacker. This is basically
due to an intrinsic vulnerability of the verification
process described in Section II-B3. In fact, the
Blockcerts protocol does not verify that the is-
suer id extracted from a certificate indeed points to
a web address that is owned by the legitimate issu-
ing institution. This allows hijacking of the verifier
towards a fake issuer profile, which can perfectly
resemble the one of the legitimate institution.
Actually, a fake issuer profile was created for the
Universita` Politecnica delle Marche and hosted on
a Github domain. The public key included in such a
profile has no relation with the real institution, since
it was auto-generated for the purposes of this work.
During the verification process, the Blockcerts pro-
tocol checks the public key on the blockchain trans-
action corresponding to the certificate, and com-
pares it with the key included in the issuer profile
published online. As we show next, this brings to a
successfull verification through Blockcerts, and to a
forged certificate that is practically indistinguishable
from a legitimate one. This results in the fabrication
of a certificate for the Italian Laurea in Electronic
Engineering by impersonating the issuing institution
Universita` Politecnica delle Marche.
A. Creation of the certificate
Two Ethereum blockchain keypairs were first
generated: one for the issuer (university) and one
for the recipient (student). After that, a Blockcerts-
compliant certificate has been designed. This step
7can obviously be skipped if the issuer already has
defined its own Blockcerts-compliant certificates.
A new certificate is then issued to the student,
including the blockchain public key of the student,
the student’s personal information and a diploma
supplement. The correctness of this information is
validated according to the Blockcerts and Open
Badges standards, after which an unsigned certifi-
cate is obtained. Such a certificate is then signed
with the issuer keypair and issued through a transac-
tion on the Ethereum blockchain. The main content
of such a blockchain transaction is the certificate
Merkle root. In our case, since one single certificate
was issued, the Merkle root coincides with the cer-
tificate hash digest. This way, a signed Blockcerts-
compliant certificate is obtained, as shown in Fig-
ure 7. Note that the signed certificate includes
the blockchain receipt, providing all the necessary
details for retrieving the blockchain transaction and
performing the blockchain-based verification of the
certificate according to the Blockcerts standard.
This signed certificate can be verified through any
web-based or stand-alone tool compliant with the
Blockcerts protocol. Let us use for this purpose the
Blockcerts Universal Verifier1. The outcome of the
verification, so performed, is shown in Figure 8. The
verification process indeed ended with a positive
result. Moreover, the verification window reports the
issuing university logo and the title of the certificate
(in this case: Master’s Degree in Electronic Engi-
neering), followed by the name of the recipient, the
issuance date and the name of the issuing institution.
The diploma supplement and its contents can be
visualized as well.
The details of the corresponding Ethereum trans-
action2 are reported in Figure 9.
B. Analysis of the verification process
Let us describe how it is possible that a fabricated
certificate passes all the verification steps required
by the Blockcerts protocol by analyzing them in
detail.
As shown in Figure 8, the first verification step
consists in reading the transaction id, through which
the details reported in Figure 9 are retrieved. Then,
a local hash digest of the certificate is computed,
1https://www.blockcerts.org/
2Available at https://etherscan.io/tx/0x14e97be56509d716cf7f318
179753ed985360cbc6164ad3c09519fa8790f2f0c
Figure 7: Blockcerts signed certificate
and the remote hash digest is retrieved from the
associated blockchain transaction.
The next verification step consists in getting the
issuer profile referenced by the issuer id. This is
a crucial point for the successfull verification of a
fabricated certificate, and is schematically described
in Figure 10. As we notice from the figure, the
issuer id points to a custom url that has no relation
with the legitimate issuer. This is the point where
hijacking of the verification occurs, and the use of
a fabricated issuer profile is enforced. The next step
consists in parsing the issuer keys, that is, extracting
the issuer public key from the public issuer profile,
which in our case was fabricated.
8Figure 8: Certificate verification through the Block-
certs Universal Verifier
Figure 9: Ethereum blockchain transaction details
Figure 10: Getting the issuer profile
The verification process continues with a second
block of steps concerning the hash digest compar-
ison. The first of these steps verifies that the hash
of the certificate locally computed coincides with
that included in the certificate receipt. This proves
that the certificate has not been modified since its
issuance. In the next step, the system compares the
Merkle root value written on the certificate receipt
with the Merkle root written on the blockchain. As
a next step, the certificate receipt is checked to
verify that the certificate under analysis is part of
the Merkle tree. In our case, only one certificate
was issued and its hash digest corresponds with the
Merkle root value. This is denoted by leaving the
proof field empty in the certificate receipt. In such
a case, the system realizes that only one certificate
was issued and verifies that the Merkle root values
in the certificate and blockchain are correct and
coincide with the certificate hash digest.
Instead, when a batch of certificates is issued,
the proof field is filled with the necessary values
to create the path from the current certificate to the
Merkle root. An illustrative example is shown in
Figure 11, in which the Merkle path is colored in
orange. With this information, the system is able
to calculate the final value of the Merkle root of
the whole batch of certificates. If the certificate
is part of the batch, then the calculated Merkle
root value is the same as the value written on the
certificate. Otherwise, an error occurs, meaning that
the certificate is not part of the batch, and therefore,
is not valid.
9Figure 11: Merkle tree path for the verification of a
certificate
At this point, it has been proved that the cer-
tificate has not been modified since its issuance
and that it is actually written on the blockchain.
The next block of verification steps, named status
check, concerns the certificate authentication. The
first one of these checks concerns the revocation
status, and is aimed at verifying that the certificate
has not been revoked by the issuer. In fact, a list
of revoked certificates is available online along with
the issuer profile, as shown in Figure 12. The system
goes through such a list to check if it includes
the certificate under analysis or not. In case the
certificate identifier is found in the list of revoked
certificates, an error message is returned and the
verification fails, otherwise the system continues
with the next verification step.
Figure 12: Checking revocation of a certificate
The subsequent step, named authenticity check-
ing step, is a very crucial element in the veri-
fication process. This step aims at verifying that
the certificate was actually issued by the claimed
institution. According to the Blockcerts standard,
the certificate authenticity is checked as explained
in Section II-B3. For the certificate under analysis,
the steps performed for checking its authenticity are
schematically described in Figure 13.
For this purpose, the hosted id field is first read
from the certificate, and the corresponding public
key is retrieved from the issuer profile available
online, at the web address specified in the hosted id
field. Such a public key is then compared with
the one reported in the blockchain transaction.
If the two keys coincide, the system checks the
timestamps as explained before. If such a check
is successful, verification proceeds by checking if
the certificate has an expiry date, after which the
verification process is completed.
In our case, the fabricated certificate was able to
pass all the verification steps, and is therefore con-
sidered as a valid Blockcerts-compliant certificate.
This proves that such a protocol does not allow
distinguishing the legitimate issuer from someone
impersonating it. This is due to the fact that the
Blockcerts standard does not require any verification
that the keys used to sign a certificate are actually
owned by the legitimate issuing institution. For this
reason, everyone creating a new keypair can sign
a Blockcerts-compliant certificate and impersonate
the legitimate issuing institution.
IV. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
The vulnerability of the Blockcerts standard de-
scribed in the previous sections builds upon the
lack of any certification about the ownership of
the keys used for signing issued certificates. In
order to prevent forgery attacks exploiting such
a vulnerability, suitable countermeasures must be
adopted by introducing a mechanism to check that
such keys indeed correspond to the digital identity
of the legitimate issuing institution.
A natural solution of this type could be replacing
the issuer profile referenced from the issuer id field
with a digital certificate containing the public key of
the issuing institution, and released by an accredited
certification authority. In this way, the authenticity
of the certificate can be checked through a classic
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and the online
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Figure 13: Checking authenticity of a certificate
information about the issuer retrieved through the
issuer id is certified.
Starting from July 2016, the eIDAS (electronic
identification, authentication and trust services)
came into effect in the European Union. The eIDAS
regulation defines three types of electronic signa-
tures [17]:
1) Electronic Signature (data in electronic form
which is attached to or logically associated
with other data in electronic form and which
is used by the signatory to sign).
2) Advanced Electronic Signature (an electronic
signature which meets the following require-
ments: a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory,
b) it is capable of identifying the signatory, c)
it is created using electronic signature creation
data that the signatory can use, with a high
level of confidence, under his sole control, and
d) it is linked to the data signed therewith in
such a way that any subsequent change in the
data is detectable).
3) Qualified Electronic Signature (an advanced
electronic seal, which is created by a qualified
electronic seal creation device, and that is
based on a qualified certificate for electronic
seal).
The only type of signatures universally recognized
by all EU states and given the equivalent legal
effect of a handwritten signature are qualified sig-
natures. The eIDAS regulation also provides the
requirements for qualified certificates. Since most
of the blockchain platforms (like the Ethereum
blockchain used in our case) use ECDSA signatures,
a natural solution would be using an ECC-based
X.509 certificate format to link the issuer identity
with its ECC-based public key. The contents of a
certificate of this type are schematically represented
in Figure 14 [18].
This solution provides an effective way to over-
come the Blockcerts issuer identity verification
11
Figure 14: ECC-based X.509 certificate format
problem and to give a legal value to the Blockcerts
academic certificate, owing to eIDAS compliance.
On the other hand, the ECC-based certificate is
signed by a Trusted Service Provider (TSP), and va-
lidity of the certificate relies on validity of the TSP
signature. The main drawback of such a solution is
in the fact that, this way, the verification system
is no longer decentralized, needing a Certificate
Authority (CA) to verify the identity of the issuer
and sign the ECC-based certificate.
In order to overcome such a drawback, Decen-
tralized Identifiers (DIDs) could be considered as
an alternative solution. In fact, there are currently
working groups in the W3C and in the Decen-
tralized Identity Foundation (DIF) with the goal
to achieve a common understanding of the gen-
eral architecture of decentralized identity systems
based on Blockchain and DLT (Distributed Ledger
Technology), and to develop standards that enable
interoperability between different implementations
even on different DLT platforms, while follow-
ing privacy and security-by-design principles [19].
Some of these initiatives are [19]:
1) W3C Community Group - Decentralized
Identifier
2) W3C Working Group - Verifiable Claims
3) DIF - DID Auth
Although these initiatives still do not provide con-
solidated standards and practices, in the mid term
they are expected to represent an effective solution
to restore the completely decentralized nature of
Blockcerts and similar protocols while countering
forgery attacks like those described in this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed a blockchain-based protocol
for the certification of academic credentials named
Blockcerts, which aims at certifying digital cer-
tificates compliant with the Open Badges standard
through a public blockchain. We have reviewed all
the steps that are required for the creation of Open
Badges-compliant digital academic credentials and
for their certification according to the Blockcerts
protocol. From such an analysis it results that the
Blockchain protocol does not provide any strong
mechanism for authenticating the issuing institu-
tion, since the issuer authentication is basically
performed on the basis of an unauthenticated issuer
profile available online and referenced from inside
the certificate.
We have shown how a legitimate issuing institu-
tion can be easily impersonated by suitably fabricat-
ing a fake issuer profile. This way, apparently legit-
imate academic credentials can be released, which
the Blockcerts validation mechanisms are unable to
distinguish from valid academic credentials issued
by the legitimate institution. This clearly highlights
a vulnerability of this protocol, especially when it
is used for the certification of academic credentials
with legal value.
In order to overcome such a vulnerability, we
have proposed to resort to a classic PKI and replace
the issuer profile with a certificate signed by a
recognized certification authority. This, however,
infringes the decentralized nature of the Blockcerts
infrastructure. Alternatively, a decentralized identity
system could be used instead of a classic PKI
to preserve the fully decentralized nature of the
paradigm. Such systems, however, are currently
under development, and therefore cannot provide an
immediate solution to the highlighted vulnerability.
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